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Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government moved 
aggressively to close loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
to restructure underperforming state assets deemed central to economic 
development. Over the next decade, the state laid off  almost 50 mil-
lion workers—40 percent of the public-enterprise workforce (Naughton 
2007, p. 179). The adjustment of labor and other factors to this restruc-
turing accommodated the rise of private enterprises and ushered in a 
sustained period of productivity growth. The wealth of newly minted 
entrepreneurs attested to the success of China’s “privatization” of its 
industrial sector (Lardy 2014; Nee and Opper 2012).
While much attention has focused on the performance of China’s 
private sector, its state sector is now coming under renewed interna-
tional scrutiny. Even with the ascendancy of the private sector, China’s 
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises have hardly disappeared 
and are among the country’s largest fi rms. Geopolitically, this renewed 
interest is partly due to trade confl ict in industries dominated by state 
enterprises, such as steel and shipbuilding, where shifts in global 
demand following the Great Recession led to global overcapacity and 
falling prices. Despite two decades of reform, state enterprises con-
tinue to dominate major sectors of the Chinese economy and have also 
emerged as global titans. Kowalski et al. (2013) investigate the extent 
of state ownership among the world’s 2,000 largest companies—the so-
called Forbes Global 2,000—and their 330,000 subsidiaries worldwide. 
Using an equally weighted average of shares of state-owned enterprises 
in sales, assets, and market value of the country’s top 10 fi rms, they 
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fi nd that China tops the list of countries with the highest state presence 
among its globally elite enterprises. 
That state fi rms remain an important aspect of the Chinese economy 
is not a surprise since, as Naughton (2007) notes, “there has never been 
a clearly articulated rationale for privatization” (p. 324). Without a spe-
cifi c privatization policy, the nature of industrial restructuring must be 
discerned from the historical record. In this chapter, we examine the 
characteristics of fi rms that were retained by the Chinese state and those 
that were released to the private sector. We begin our analysis by track-
ing the evolution of enterprises away from China’s state sector, a task 
complicated by alternative defi nitions of state control, limited data, and 
opaque ownership arrangements. An initial contribution of this chapter, 
then, is the provision of new estimates of the size of the state sector, 
with a comparison to other recent characterizations in the literature. 
To better understand the factors that infl uenced state decision mak-
ing, we review and categorize various descriptions of the objectives of 
both central and local governments in enterprise restructuring. We then 
formulate these views as hypotheses and test them using data from Chi-
na’s Annual Survey of Industrial Production. We employ a linear prob-
ability model to link fi rm characteristics to the likelihood of remaining 
under state control. We undertake this exercise for two time intervals: 
1998–2002, a period following massive urban state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) restructuring and signifi cant labor unrest; and 2002–2006, the 
early years of the Hu administration.1 We then summarize the fi ndings 
of recent analyses of restructuring’s success in reducing factor misal-
locations and, hence, its contribution to productivity growth. Finally, 
we use our analysis of the grasp-or-release decision to highlight some 
of the challenges of continued SOE reforms.
OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING, ENTERPRISE 
CLASSIFICATION, AND THE EXTENT OF STATE 
CONTROL IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Identifi cation and measurement of the Chinese “state sector” are 
complicated by the variety of ways in which state-controlled fi rms are 
organized. According to Gan (2009), SOE restructuring stems from 
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policies initiated in the 1980s and early 1990 permitting changes to 
enterprise governance structures rather than outright privatization. The 
formal adoption of the Company Law in 1994 provided a legal frame-
work into which diff erent ownership forms could fi t. The law permitted 
the formal conversion of state-owned enterprises to joint stock compa-
nies, allowing for the option of selling off  some or all shares of the new 
organization (Naughton 2007, p. 301). Shareholding conversion, called 
“corporatization” when the state retains a controlling interest, became a 
broad-based initiative after 1997 when the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Fifteenth Congress elevated the shareholding system as a vehicle for 
enterprise restructuring. The changing ownership composition was also 
shaped by the adoption at the Fifteenth Party Congress of the policy 
known as “grasping the large, letting go of the small” (Gan, Guo, and 
Xu 2015). This policy sought to protect and promote the largest, typi-
cally centrally controlled, state enterprises while spurring the privati-
zation or exit of smaller, often loss-making, enterprises controlled by 
lower levels of government. The policy quickly led to dramatic changes 
in China’s industrial sector. Jeff erson et al. (2005) fi nd that from 1997 
to 2001 the number of large and medium-sized SOEs declined by over 
40 percent, and the number of large and medium-sized collective enter-
prises declined by 35 percent, while the number of shareholding fi rms 
soared.
These policies resulted in a distinct blurring of boundaries between 
state-controlled and privately held enterprises. Since 2001, the evolu-
tion of the Chinese industrial sector has continued, but tracking the 
extent to which state control has receded is diffi  cult. China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics assigns each fi rm an ownership classifi cation, 
known as its “registration status.” State-owned enterprises include 
those that are majority owned by the central government or a local 
government, those registered to the state but jointly operated with a 
nonstate entity, and those wholly state owned. Private fi rms, by registra-
tion status, include those registered to natural persons, whether solely, 
in partnership, as limited liability enterprises, or shareholding fi rms. 
Distinctions between ownership types become truly opaque in another 
type of domestic registration status, legal persons. Firms registered as 
legal persons include limited liability and shareholding limited liability 
fi rms. Their relationship to the state is not indicated by their registration 
status. An additional complication is that the state may control fi rms in 
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which it has only a minority holding, fi rms that are correctly registered 
as private or foreign owned. These complexities imply that measures 
of the state-controlled industrial share drawn from aggregate statistics 
based on registration type are misleading.
Enterprises registered as legal persons are mostly shareholding 
fi rms, an organizational form integral to reform of China’s state-owned 
enterprises (Jeff erson et al. 2005). Shareholding fi rms may operate under 
state control, may be privately controlled, or may simply be “hybrid 
ownership.” Fortunately, progress in identifying fi rms not classifi ed as 
SOEs by registration status yet controlled by the state can be made by 
accessing additional information contained in China’s Annual Survey 
of Industrial Production (ASIP). This census of all state-owned enter-
prises and other industrial fi rms with revenues above 5 million RMB 
is available to us for the period 1998–2006 only. The ASIP includes 
information on the origin of the various sources of registered capital 
in the fi rm—the state, collectives, legal persons, private persons, and 
foreigners.2 This information on equity shares can be used to classify 
fi rms based on majority ownership. If 50 percent or more of equity 
originates from state, collective, private, or foreign sources, the enter-
prise can be reclassifi ed accordingly. However, for many fi rms, legal 
person is a signifi cant source of capital, making it impossible to classify 
these fi rms based on paid-in capital shares alone. Indeed, of the 54,320 
fi rms offi  cially registered as legal person, 21,910 enterprises cannot be 
reclassifi ed using equity information because the majority of their capi-
tal originates from a legal person. In other words, equity shares do not 
allow us to completely peer around the veil of legal-person status. 
Other researchers have faced this problem. Dollar and Wei (2007) 
add legal-person capital to private capital before calculating majority 
ownership. While subsequent researchers have followed the same pro-
cedure, this method ignores Huang’s (2008) observation that categoriz-
ing legal-person fi rms as private can be misleading because “(e)ven a 
casual glance at the data reveals that many of these legal-person share-
holding fi rms are among the best-known and quintessential SOEs in 
China” (p. 16). Huang concludes that “(t)he majority of the sharehold-
ing fi rms, especially the large ones, are still state-controlled” (p. 46). 
His observation suggests that an alternative grouping of fi rms, in which 
legal-person capital is treated as state-owned capital before calculating 
majority ownership, is also reasonable.3 Kamal and Lovely (2013) take 
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a middle approach in their study of labor misallocation: they separate 
legal-person enterprises from both SOEs and fi rms registered as pri-
vately owned.
Fortunately, the ASIP contains additional information that defi nes 
the fi rm’s controlling shareholder as either the state, a collective, a for-
eigner, or a private person. Together with data on equity shares, the ASIP 
allows us to defi ne state-owned and state-controlled (SOSC) fi rms. We 
defi ne a fi rm as SOSC when it is registered as an SOE, when the share 
of registered capital held directly by the state exceeds or equals 50 per-
cent, or when the state is reported as the controlling shareholder. The 
method captures those fi rms registered as SOEs and those in which the 
state holds a controlling interest, whether directly or through a holding 
company. Hsieh and Song (2015) use a similar method to identify state-
controlled fi rms, and they report that this method resulted in correct 
categorization when they manually checked the results using informa-
tion directly from fi rm websites.4
To identify enterprises that remain under state control from those 
that transition to another type of ownership, we need to trace fi rms over 
time. However, linking fi rms across years can be problematic because 
fi rm IDs may be changed or missing when there are revisions in legal 
registration status. We follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang’s 
(2012) method of constructing complete fi rm histories. We supplement 
matching via the fi rm’s Legal Person Entity Code with matching based 
on fi ve additional identifi ers: fi rm name, industry code, geographic 
code, founding year, and name of main product. After completing this 
multistep procedure, we can match over time more than 95 percent of 
the fi rms in the data set.
The state sector appears to recede far less when corporatized yet 
state-controlled fi rms are included in the defi nition of state enterprises 
rather than considered private fi rms. Figure 5.1 shows trends in the share 
of total enterprises by type of ownership. When ownership is defi ned 
using NBS registration status, the number of state-owned enterprises 
falls by more than 90 percent between 1998 and 2006, accounting for 
only about 3 percent of all above-scale fi rms by 2006.5 However, using 
information on equity shares to defi ne ownership allows us to observe 
another 1 percent of fi rms as being state majority owned in 2006. We 
also fi nd an additional 1 percent of fi rms for which ownership cannot be 
determined directly from paid-in capital shares but which are identifi ed 
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as state controlled by the NBS. In total, we fi nd that about 5 percent of 
total enterprises are state owned and controlled in 2006. 
If these adjustments seem too small to bother with, Table 5.1 shows 
that the state controls a much larger share of industrial output than the 
number of fi rms might suggest. As seen in Figure 5.2, fi rms registered 
as SOEs account for 15 percent of gross industrial output, even though 
they make up only 3 percent of all enterprises. Similarly, corporatized 
fi rms controlled by the state punch above their numbers due to their 
larger than average size. Firms in which the state owns 50 percent or 
more of registered capital provide 5.4 percent of gross output, while 
fi rms controlled by the state without having registered majority state 
ownership account for fully 11 percent of gross output. Altogether, as 
shown in Figure 5.2, SOSC enterprises provided 31.4 percent of gross 
industrial output by 2006, more than double the share produced by reg-
istered SOEs, and that the decline in state share appears to level out by 
2005.
Figure 5.3 shows trends in output shares for SOSC fi rms, distin-
guished by their offi  cial registration type. While about 60 percent of 
state-controlled fi rms are registered as SOEs, the share of SOSC fi rms 
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registered as limited liability corporations grew dramatically after 2001. 
Recognizing that fi rms offi  cially registered as legal-person enterprises 
are larger than average, properly classifying these organizational forms 
is integral to tracking the extent of state control in China’s industrial 
sector. Proper classifi cation leads to quite diff erent conclusions about 
the extent of “privatization” from that drawn using registration type 
alone. We conclude that the Chinese state continues to control fi rms 
supplying more than 30 percent of industrial output and that earlier 
downward trends in the state share appear to level off  by 2005. 
GRASPING AND RELEASING
Large-scale restructuring of China’s state-owned fi rms began in the 
late 1990s. As we have shown, this process resulted in a smaller share 
of fi rms owned by the state. With about a third of gross industrial out-
put still under state control, however, we now examine the characteris-
tics of those enterprises chosen by the state to be released and which it 
Table 5.1  Enterprise Size and Performance: Linear Probability Model of 
Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002 
and 2002–2006
1998–2002 2002–2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)




























Observations 55,502 55,502 35,719 35,719
Industry fi xed 
eff ects
No Yes No Yes
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if fi rm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full-time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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chose to grasp. Such an analysis provides insight into both the process 
of sculpting the modern state sector in China, and also the problems that 
continued to face the state industrial sector after 2006.
The slogan “grasp the large, let go of the small” suggests that 
enterprise performance was a major determinant of decisions about 
industrial restructuring. Naughton (2007) reports that “In ‘grasping the 
large,’ policymakers sought to focus their attention on the largest, typi-
cally centrally controlled fi rms” (p. 31). In addition to size, the fi nancial 
status of the fi rm likely contributed to the retention decision. An impe-
tus for selling assets, especially at the local level, was the negative bud-
getary impact associated with loss-making and insolvent enterprises. 
Firms with debts in excess of the value of their assets were essentially 
bankrupt. Because of “soft budget constraints” in the period before 
restructuring, enterprises could lose money for a prolonged period yet 
continue to receive fi nancing and investment. These injections of funds 
sapped the resources of local governments and contributed to concerns 
about government indebtedness. As reported by Gan, Guo, and Xu 
(2015, p. 7), by the late 1990s, “the deteriorating performance of SOEs 
put increasing pressure on the fi scal conditions of local governments 
because they are the residual claimants of the SOE earnings and some 
were on the verge of insolvency following the losses of their SOEs.” 
While selling off  the shares of insolvent fi rms may have solved the 
government’s problem, fi nding buyers for such fi rms would be diffi  cult 
without some indication that the fi rm could be profi table. Consequently, 
profi tability may also have been a factor in determining which enter-
prises the state retained, with better-performing fi rms being sold while 
others were held under various organizational forms. We can summa-
rize these enterprise performance criteria for retaining a fi rm under state 
control in the following hypothesis:
H1: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an en-
terprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, fi nancially viable, and less 
profi table. These factors matter in both time periods, 1998–2002 and 
2002–2006.
To test this hypothesis, we measure the size, viability, and profi t-
ability of each fi rm in the initial year of each time period. Table 5.2 
provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in our regression 
analysis. We measure enterprise size as the gross value of industrial 
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output of the fi rm relative to the average output value of private fi rms 
in the same three-digit industry. Viability is measured as the ratio for 
the fi rm of total current assets to total current liabilities. Lastly, we use 
sales revenue divided by total assets of the enterprise as a measure of 
fi rm profi tability.
Some observers express the view that privatization was shaped by a 
desire to continue to guide economic development through the alloca-
tion of resources to sectors with strategic importance. Naughton (2007) 
states that the central government concentrated its focus on energy, 
natural resources, and other industries with large economies of scale. 
These upstream industries provide inputs into many diff erent industrial 
activities and thus have strategic importance in driving economic devel-
opment. The state may then have sought to retain control of fi rms in the 
upstream industries.
While local governments were given de jure control rights for local 
SOEs in 1997, the pressures they faced to restructure were associated 
with their own resources and assets. Lower levels of government held 
assets that may have been deemed less strategically important and more 
tempting to use as a source of revenue. Gan, Guo, and Xu (2015) fi nd 
that direct sales of fi rm assets to insiders was the method of privatization 
used most often by local governments to release local SOEs from state 
control. This method of privatization is the most controversial because 
it lacks transparency and may result in the underpricing of state assets. 
Thus, local governments may have found SOEs under their jurisdiction 
less strategically important to retain and more tempting to sell off . We 
can summarize these strategic importance perspectives on state control 
in the following hypothesis:
H2: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enter-
prise that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector 
and was affi  liated with a higher level of government. 
To measure strategic importance, we control for the degree of 
“upstreamness” of the three-digit industry to which the enterprise 
belongs. We measure this industry characteristic using the upstream 
index for two-digit sectors created by Tang, Wang, and Wang (2016) 
for China using the method of Antras et al. (2012). The index essen-
tially measures the number of industries between a producer and the 
fi nal consumer, with a higher number indicating that the fi rm has a 
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more upstream location in the production chain. We also include a set 
of dummy variables indicating the level of government with which the 
enterprise is affi  liated. The ASIP contains this information, distinguish-
ing between central, provincial, city, or town government affi  liation.
The last set of explanations for privatization decisions refers to 
what we can term “legacy burdens.” These burdens refl ect the use of 
state enterprises to achieve goals other than production and take three 
forms: social burdens, strategic burdens, and competitive burdens. 
Because these burdens reduce the effi  ciency and profi tability of state 
enterprises, they distinguish fi rms that may be diffi  cult to sell off  with-
out prior restructuring and that fi ll an important and continuing social 
obligation.
Prior to the mid-1990s, state enterprises often served to ensure full 
employment in urban areas, a responsibility for social stability termed 
the “social burden” by Lin (2012). Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) explain 
that SOE managers were prohibited from fi ring urban workers and that 
municipal governments continued to place workers into state-sector 
jobs well into the 1990s even when they were not required. We hypoth-
esize that excess staffi  ng would contribute to the desirability of priva-
tizing a fi rm to increase productivity, but the problem of uninsured and 
unemployed workers would remain. Indeed, Lin argues that much of 
this responsibility remains today with SOEs, who still shoulder a social 
burden. 
Another burden identifi ed by Lin (2012) is what he terms the 
“strategic burden.” This handicap resulted from the presence of state 
enterprises in sectors deemed strategically important for economic 
development but not in line with China’s comparative advantage. 
These enterprises would not be viable without signifi cant state support, 
including competitive restrictions. To the extent that the state continues 
to seek industrial upgrading, they may have retained control of enter-
prises in these “comparative-advantage-defying” industries.
A fi nal burden for state enterprises fl ows from a competitive squeeze 
experienced by local SOEs operating in sectors dominated by foreign-
invested fi rms and large, centrally controlled SOEs. These enterprises 
may not be able to withstand the pressure of more advanced competi-
tors and, thus, may be allowed to go bankrupt or be sold.
We can summarize these legacy-burden considerations in the fol-
lowing hypothesis.
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H3: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enter-
prise if, ceteris paribus, it bore a larger social burden; it bore a strategic 
burden related to comparative disadvantage; it was subject to a com-
petitive squeeze from foreign fi rms and large SOEs. 
To measure the social burden borne by a fi rm, we create an index of 
overstaffi  ng based on average labor productivity in the industry. Specifi -
cally, we calculate sales revenue per employee in each given fi rm and 
divide by the average sales per employee in the fi rm’s three-digit indus-
try. Higher values of the index indicate that the fi rm has a higher labor 
productivity relative to the average fi rm in the industry. The strategic 
burden refl ects an industry’s comparative advantage, so we create an 
industry-level measure based on the ratio of export sales to total domes-
tic sales. Higher values of this measure indicate that the industry has 
strong international sales. Lastly, we control for the competitive squeeze 
by including the market share in each three-digit industry of private 
fi rms, foreign-invested enterprises, and centrally affi  liated SOEs. 
REGRESSION RESULTS
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a linear probability model of the 
likelihood that a state enterprise remains active and state controlled by 
the end of the period.6 Our dependent variable takes the value of unity 
if an initially state-controlled fi rm remains state controlled, using the 
method of classifying enterprises as SOSC described above, until the 
last year in the interval. Since China experienced a change of regime 
(President Hu took offi  ce in December 2002) and reemphasized deepen-
ing SOE reform in the 16th CPC Plenary Session, we divide our sample 
into two periods. The sample contains 67,509 initially state-controlled 
fi rms for the period 1998–2002 and 40,857 initially state-controlled 
fi rms for the period 2002–2006. 
Table 5.1 provides the results of the linear probability estimation, 
including only those variables related to fi rm performance. We use 
these results to test the hypothesis that the government was more likely 
to retain control of an enterprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, fi nan-
cially viable, and less profi table. For each period we provide estimates 
with and without the inclusion of an industry fi xed eff ect.
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As seen in Table 5.1, all three fi rm performance indicators are sig-
nifi cant determinants of state retention. The estimated coeffi  cient on 
enterprise size, normed by average industry output value, is positive 
and highly signifi cant in both time periods. The coeffi  cient, when esti-
mated with industry fi xed eff ects, is of very similar magnitude in both 
periods. A 1 percent increase in a fi rm’s output value relative to the 
industry average, all else equal, raises the probability that it is retained 
by the state by about 5 percentage points. 
A fi rm’s fi nancial viability, measured as the ratio of its assets to its 
liabilities, is also a signifi cant determinant of state retention. When we 
include industry fi xed eff ects, the estimated coeffi  cient implies that a 1 
percent increase in this ratio raises the probability that the state main-
tains control by about 3 percentage points. This fi nding is consistent 
with the view that the state sold off  enterprises that were bankrupt. 
Our last indicator of fi rm performance is ROA, the ratio of fi rm 
revenues to assets. The estimated coeffi  cient is negative and highly 
signifi cant, even when we include industry fi xed eff ects. A 1 percent 
increase in this revenue ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention 
by 2.6 percentage points over the period 1998–2002 and by 1.6 points 
over the period 2002–2006. This fi nding is consistent with state reten-
tion of underperforming assets. In the data set, 45 percent of initially 
SOSC fi rms remain state controlled by 2002 and 39 percent by 2006, 
so the magnitudes of the marginal eff ects on retention decisions of all 
three fi rm performance factors appear to be both economically and sta-
tistically signifi cant. 
We extend our analysis with the results shown in Table 5.3, which 
provides coeffi  cient estimates obtained by adding the strategic impor-
tance characteristics  to our linear probability model. We hypothesize 
that the Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise 
that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector and 
was affi  liated with a higher level of government. Since our upstream 
index is an industry characteristic, we do not include industry fi xed 
eff ects in these models.
Surprisingly, we fi nd that the upstreamness of the fi rm’s industry 
is not signifi cantly correlated with the probability of state retention in 
either period. Moreover, the level of governmental affi  liation has no 
signifi cant relation to retained control over the period 1998–2002, dur-
ing which the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee had the 
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political support necessary to issue an offi  cial policy statement on the 
urgency of reform of state-owned enterprises (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 1999). Our results suggest that the party was 
then able to align the direction of reform at all levels of government. 
During the fi rst years of the Hu administration, however, the level 
of state affi  liation appears to have become a powerful determinant of 
whether a fi rm remained under state control. Being affi  liated with the 
central government raised the likelihood of remaining state controlled 
by an estimated 21.6 percentage points, while affi  liation with a prov-
ince or provincial-level city raised the likelihood of retention by 16.7 
percent, both measured relative to the likelihood of retention of fi rms 
affi  liated with city or town governments. These estimated magnitudes 
are quite large and suggest that corporatization, rather than privatiza-
Table 5.3  Strategic Centrality: Linear Probability Model of Firm 
Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002 and 
2002–2006
1998–2002 2002–2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)










ln Viability 0.0467*** 0.0345*** 0.0489*** 0.0321***
(0.00471) (0.00291) (0.00472) (0.00393)
ln Return on assets −0.0350*** −0.0272*** −0.0269*** −0.0145***
(0.00439) (0.00374) (0.00410) (0.00391)
Upstream index 0.0150 −0.00899 0.0164 −0.00222
(0.0197) (0.0101) (0.0228) (0.0115)
Central affi  liated 0.144 0.216**
(0.150) (0.0939)
Province affi  liated 0.117 0.167***
(0.0913) (0.0510)
City affi  liated −0.00493 0.0745
(0.0488) (0.0458)
Observations 43,819 43,819 24,686 24,686
Industry fi xed eff ects No No No No
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0. 01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if fi rm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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tion, became the mode of choice for higher-level governments seeking 
to improve the performance of their state assets. Enterprises associated 
with local governments were more likely to be privatized or closed, all 
else equal, than those affi  liated with higher levels.
Table 5.4 provides additional results that include measures of the 
legacy burdens faced by each state-controlled fi rm. We hypothesize that 
an enterprise was more likely to be retained if it bore a larger social 
burden, bore a strategic burden related to comparative disadvantage, 
and was subject to a competitive squeeze from foreign fi rms and large 
SOEs. Among all these factors, our results suggest that only the social 
burden is a signifi cant determinant of state privatization decisions. Esti-
mate coeffi  cients for the strategic burden variable, defi ned as the export 
success of the fi rm’s industry, and all measures of the competitive 
squeeze faced by local SOEs are statistically insignifi cant in both peri-
ods. In contrast, the coeffi  cient for social burden is signifi cant in both 
periods. Defi ned as the fi rm’s sales per worker relative to the average 
sales per worker in the industry, social burden is a measure of relative 
labor productivity. Our results indicate that a 1 percent increase in this 
ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention by 2.7 percentage points 
in the fi rst period, 1998–2002, and by 0.8 points in the second period, 
2002–2006. Essentially, fi rms with better labor productivity were more 
likely to be privatized or exit than to remain state controlled. This fi nd-
ing supports the view that restructuring did not discharge all SOE social 
burdens and that the state sector continues to some extent to bear the 
legacy of social stability goals, as argued by Lin (2012).
STATE RESTRUCTURING AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Our regression analysis indicates that larger, more fi nancially stable 
fi rms, especially those affi  liated with higher levels of government, were 
more likely to remain under state control. We also fi nd that the state 
was less likely to shed enterprises with low labor productivity. These 
patterns are consistent with the creation of a state sector comprising 
fi rms with dominant industry positions but possibly weak performance. 
Explicit comparison of state fi rms to nonstate fi rms, a task that has 
recently been undertaken by several groups of researchers, is important 
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Table 5.4  Legacy Burdens and Competitive Squeeze: Linear Probability 
Model of Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 
1998–2002 and 2002–2006
1998–2002 2002–2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)










ln Viability 0.0387*** 0.0379*** 0.0332*** 0.0324***
(0.00401) (0.00391) (0.00420) (0.00385)
ln Return on assets –0.0155*** –0.0158*** –0.0111*** –0.0111***
(0.00316) (0.00339) (0.00378) (0.00384)
Upstream index –0.00814 –0.00954 –0.00334 0.000485
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0142)
Central affi  liated 0.161 0.132 0.205* 0.199***
(0.171) (0.159) (0.101) (0.0559)
Province affi  liated 0.147 0.134 0.152*** 0.145***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.0515) (0.0514)
City affi  liated 0.00551 –0.00277 0.0669 0.0637
(0.0624) (0.0611) (0.0432) (0.0386)
Social burden –0.0273*** –0.0271*** –0.00887** –0.00853**
(0.00471) (0.00471) (0.00390) (0.00363)
Strategic burden –0.0102 –0.0100 0.00196 –0.00130
(0.00884) (0.00902) (0.00570) (0.00738)










Observations 40,317 40,317 24,686 24,686
Industry fi xed eff ects No No No No
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if fi rm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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because if factor productivity is systematically related to state status, 
and if inputs are allocated to state-controlled enterprises in a discrimi-
natory manner, the economy will not perform at its full potential. 
Performance gaps between SOEs and other types of fi rms were 
present early in the reform process: Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013) fi nd 
signifi cant productivity diff erences between the state and the nonstate 
in nonagricultural sectors from 1985 to 2007. By their estimates, over 
the entire period, misallocation of factors between the state and non-
state sectors and across provinces lowered aggregate nonagricultural 
total factor productivity (TFP) by an average of 20 percent. Interest-
ingly, given the massive layoff s of state workers beginning in the mid-
1990s, these losses—after initially declining—increased appreciably as 
retrenchment expanded. Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu attribute these trends 
almost exclusively to increasing misallocation of capital between state 
and nonstate sectors caused by contemporaneous government poli-
cies that encouraged investments in state enterprises at the expense of 
investments in the more productive nonstate sector.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also emphasize the systematic distortions 
caused by preferential access to capital in their assessment of the eco-
nomic cost of an ineffi  cient state sector. Relying on fi rm-level data to 
calculate total factor productivity, measured by revenue productivity, 
for Chinese fi rms over the period 1998–2005, they fi nd that state-owned 
fi rms exhibit 41 percent lower TFP than nonstate fi rms, an outcome con-
sistent with the provision of subsidies to these fi rms to remain active. 
These fi ndings agree with Dollar and Wei (2007), who also fi nd lower 
productivity at state-owned fi rms in China during this time. 
Misallocation of labor has also been found by researchers using 
Chinese microdata. Fleisher et al. (2011) fi nd that the marginal prod-
uct of both highly and less-educated workers is lower in SOEs than in 
domestic private or foreign-invested fi rms. Kamal and Lovely (2013) 
also focus on the allocation of labor across enterprises with a special 
emphasis on how SOEs compare to enterprises owned by legal persons, 
a category that includes “corporatized” state-owned fi rms. They cal-
culate the marginal revenue product of labor for all fi rms in the ASIP 
during two periods, 2001–2004 and 2004–2007. They fi nd that labor 
productivity varies systematically within industries by ownership type 
and that all organizational forms, on average, exhibit higher labor pro-
ductivities than do SOEs. Indeed, labor in enterprises registered as legal 
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persons had a higher average product than labor employed in private 
fi rms. Kamal and Lovely also fi nd that labor productivity diff erentials 
fell over time, with the gap between SOEs and other fi rm types falling 
by about half between the two periods they analyze.
Several recent studies account for the sources of China’s economic 
growth, attempting to discern the particular contribution of SOE restruc-
turing. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) estimate TFP at the 
fi rm level using the ASIP for the period 1998–2007. They fi nd that the 
main source of growing aggregate TFP is productivity improvement in 
continuing fi rms and the entry of new fi rms with higher productivity. 
They also fi nd that large Chinese fi rms increased productivity at a faster 
than average rate, and the restructuring of large state-owned fi rms was 
one driver for this pattern. The authors identify an important dynamic 
as the state sector receded: “The relative success in attracting new input 
factors determined relative growth rates. New state fi rms that appeared 
between 1998 and 2007 were able to produce almost fi ve times as much 
value-added as disappearing state fi rms, even though their real capi-
tal stock only grew marginally and employment was a quarter lower” 
(p. 35). Despite this positive dynamic pattern, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, 
and Zhang suggest that biases in favor of state-connected fi rms likely 
depressed productivity growth after 2007.
Hsieh and Song (2015) measure the quantitative importance of the 
restructuring policies pursued from 1998 to 2007 on aggregate produc-
tivity growth. They fi nd that reforms were potentially responsible for 
20 percent of aggregate output by 2007. Explicitly comparing surviving 
state-owned fi rms to those that were privatized, Hsieh and Song fi nd 
that for both types the labor productivity gap with surviving private 
fi rms narrowed, a fi nding consistent with Kamal and Lovely (2013), 
while the capital productivity gap narrowed by much less. Indeed, their 
estimates indicate that as late as 2007, capital productivity of state-
owned fi rms was less than 50 percent of private fi rms. 
In light of our estimates, the lower productivity of state-controlled 
fi rms appears a natural consequence of how enterprises were grasped 
and released. Our linear probability model estimates suggest that the 
state was more likely to retain control of fi rms that produced low rev-
enues relative to assets and that exhibited relatively low labor produc-
tivity. The picture that emerges is one in which the state sector was 
shaped by retention of fi rms that required continued preferential access 
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to capital and that suff ered from the failure to develop adequate alterna-
tive policies for redundant workers. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
average state sector productivity continued to lag behind the private 
sector, despite innovation in the form of state control.
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
After several decades of retrenchment, the Chinese state remains a 
dominant player in several strategic industries. State-controlled enter-
prises provide most of the output in the heavy industries, including 
oil production and distribution, minerals and mining, steel, shipbuild-
ing, and transportation equipment. The state also continues to control 
important pieces of the service sector: construction, utilities, fi nancial 
services, media, and air travel and logistics.
The outlook for the foreseeable future is one in which the Chinese 
state continues to play a major role in the economy. Hsieh and Song 
(2015) fi nd that after 2005, privatization rates declined on average even 
though they increased for small fi rms. Based on an analysis of industry-
level data, they also suggest that there was little convergence in capital 
productivity from 2007 to 2012. This fi nding suggests a continuing cost 
in terms of lost national income, especially since, according to China’s 
NBS, “state-owned and controlled enterprises” accounted for 41 per-
cent of fi xed asset investment from 2004 to 2012.
A recent study from Goldman Sachs Investment Strategy Group 
(2016) also supports the view that the return on state sector assets con-
tinues to lag. They report that “about 150,000 SOEs control over $15 
trillion of assets in China, which in aggregate and excluding fi nancial 
institutions returned 2.4 percent as of 2014” (p. 26). This return on 
assets can be compared to a 3.1 percent return estimated for comparable 
Chinese listed companies and 6.4 percent for U.S. companies. These 
numbers indicate continuing low profi tability for Chinese SOEs.
Aside from lost productivity, continued diff erential investment into 
state enterprises may make the goal of macroeconomic rebalancing 
more diffi  cult to achieve. To raise consumption, Chinese households 
must receive a larger share of aggregate income. However, while some 
parts of the state sector are very profi table, almost none of this profi t 
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is returned to the public for services or to reduce taxes. Rather, it is 
reinvested by the state sector. The likely response of households to this 
continuing pattern is to continue to hold high savings balances. Because 
continued investment in the state sector produces low returns or is non-
productive, households may guard against the eff ect of future fi nancial 
repression by saving for future higher taxes or service cuts. Investment 
in the state sector, in this sense, confl icts with the goal of pivoting the 
economy toward consumption-led growth.
In 2015, the CPC Central Committee and State Council issued 
guidelines for SOE reform emphasizing the desire for “mixed owner-
ship,” with private investors becoming shareholders in state-controlled 
fi rms (Xinhua 2015). Our analysis of the history of grasping and releas-
ing suggests that the state will continue to control the largest fi rms, 
especially those affi  liated with higher levels of government, in a variety 
of forms. Our review of recent assessments of the role of SOE reform 
in China’s growth suggests that signifi cant productivity gains have 
stemmed from privatization and corporatization. Despite these gains, 
however, SOEs as a whole continue to provide subpar returns on assets 
while receiving a disproportionate share of total investment. How much 
more their performance can be enhanced by further promotion of mixed 
ownership without full privatization remains an open question. 
Notes
 1. To fl ag wavering commitment to continued adjustment, a policy directive was 
issued in 1999 emphasizing the urgency of continued SOE reforms. See Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (1999).
 2. Foreign-owned includes capital from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and all other 
foreign sources.
 3. Other methods for classifying fi rms have also been used. For example, Brandt, 
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) use equity shares to classify fi rms as state, 
private, or hybrid.
 4. Hsieh and Song (2015) do not select fi rms based on registration type, whereas we 
include registered SOEs as SOSC fi rms. This diff erence in method makes only a 
minor diff erence in the resulting state share estimates, as registered capital held by 
the state in most registered SOEs exceeds 50 percent.
 5. Collective enterprises also declined sharply in number, falling 85 percent over the 
period. In contrast, fi rms registered as private enterprises rose sharply—the num-
ber of private fi rms grew 670 percent and constituted over half of all above-scale 
fi rms by 2006. The number of fi rms registered as legal persons, most of which are 
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shareholding enterprises, rose 160 percent by 2006. See Kamal and Lovely (2013) 
for more details.
 6. A drawback of the linear probability model is that the estimated coeffi  cients can 
imply probabilities outside the unit interval [0,1]. The model also implies constant 
marginal eff ects. We use the linear probability model here because the coeffi  cient 
values permit straightforward interpretation. When we use a logit model, our qual-
itative results remain unchanged.
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